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Abstract
We provide the theoretical foundations for a new estimation algorithm that non-parametrically
infers level-k beliefs from laboratory choices in generalized guessing games with heterogeneous
interactions. The algorithm takes the strategic dependencies of the game and subjects’ choices
as an input and returns a detailed histogram (a “pseudo-spectrogram” of seeds) that represents
population beliefs about the behavior of level-0 players. As a by-product, the algorithm also
returns the estimated population composition of reasoning levels.
The main contributions are as follows. First, we study the equilibrium properties of gener-
alized guessing games and provide an ordinal (visual) characterization for uniqueness. Second,
within the level-k model, our key theoretical results establish conditions on the subjective be-
liefs or the game structure so that the population distributions of level-k choices and the
population distribution of beliefs are alike. These results are obtained without any distribu-
tional assumptions. We also present a central limit result that supports the use of parametric
gaussian approaches often used in the literature. Third, on the basis of the theoretical re-
sults, we construct a new a non-parametric maximum likelihood estimation algorithm that
fully identifies the belief pattern. Fourth, we apply the algorithm to experimental data. It is
found that beliefs cluster around a few focal points and that a few seeds are able to explain
a high percentage of observed behavior. Finally, our theoretical results can also be useful in
the design of laboratory guessing games with good estimation properties.
Keywords: beliefs, estimation, level-k, network, mixture model.
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1 Introduction
Using a level-k approach,1 this paper analyzes the microfoundation of a non-parametric method
for estimating beliefs from laboratory choices in generalized guessing games.2 Consider a large
population of experimental subjects anonymously arranged into groups of three who face the
following simultaneous move game. Each subject in a group is assigned a player role i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and has to choose a real number xi ∈ [0, 100]. The utility of player i for a given profile of choices
x = (x1, x2, x3) within her group is ui(x) = −(xi − ti)2, where
ti = p ·
xj + xk
2
is said to be the target value of player i, and xj and xk denote the choices of the other two players
in the same group as i. We set p = 2/3 in the example, which implies that the unique Nash
equilibrium is x∗ = 0. Our analysis allows for more general games in the sense that targets may be
asymmetric (i.e., defined by a network) and may include exogenously given anchors (i.e., constants
like 50 or 80). We call this class of games anchored guessing games. Proposition 1 shows that an
anchored guessing game has a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if the dominant eigenvalue of
the matrix that represents the strategic dependencies is less than 1.3 In our motivating example
without anchors this condition reduces to p < 1, which is well-known in the literature.4
Next, we derive the optimal choices in the level-k framework when a player has subjective
beliefs about how all players in the group would behave if they were level-0 players and when these
beliefs might not match the actual behavior of level-0 players (also see, Ho, Camerer and Weigelt
1998 and Burchardi and Penczynski 2014). In our particular example:
• A level-0 subject chooses a number from [0, 100] (not necessarily uniformly at random).
1See, Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) for the seminal contributions and Crawford, Costa-Gomes,
and Iriberri (2013) for a more recent literature overview. Other well-known models of non-equilibrium behavior
include the quantal response equilibrium suggested in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and the cognitive hierarchy
model of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004).
2A working implementation is available at https://observablehq.com/@coballester, in the Javascript note-
book “Uncovering seeds”. The reader may run the algorithm using her own datasets on any computer or mobile
device.
3This type of result is standard in the literature on network economics. See, for instance, Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol and Zenou (2006), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Acemoğlu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2012), Elliot and Golub (2020), and Galeotti, Golub and Goyal (2020).
4An intermediate value of p = 2/3 can facilitate good estimation results from a design perspective. For details,
we refer the reader to the concluding discussion.
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• A level-1 subject maximizes utility given her beliefs about level-0 behavior. Consider the
















j ∈ [0, 100] is Alice’s belief about the choice of a level-0 player in role j and xk(s)i
indicates the choice of subject s in role i who is level-k. Even though we refer throughout to
e
(a)
j as a “belief”, it is in fact that the mathematical expectation of any probability distribution
on the strategy space of player j. For example, Alice could think that the level-0 player j
behaves uniformly at random on [0,100]. Then, e
(a)
j = 50.
• A level-2 subject maximizes utility viewing all other players as level-1. Suppose that Bob (b)
who also plays the game in role 2, but in a different group than Alice, is a level-2 subject.
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where E(b)[xkj ] is Bob’s belief about the choice of the level-k player in role j. Thus, the belief






3 ) is interpreted as a starting seed over which Bob iterates twice












may differ). Within-subjects heterogeneity is important in our setting because the strategic
dependencies and anchors that define the targets are possibly asymmetric.6
• And so forth for all level-k players. The optimal choice xk(s)i of a level-k subject s in this
example falls into the interval [0, (2/3)k100] because all other choices are serially dominated.
5Seeds may be originated from at least three different sources. First, a seed might be natural or intrinsic to
the subject or group (like “popular” numbers such as 50 or 100). Second, it might be part of the description of
the game. In the anchored guessing games introduced in this paper, constants may naturally arise as focal points.
Third, focal points also emerge through examples in experimental instructions.
6Bob achieves deep strategic reasoning (level 2) about others, but his eventual beliefs about a level-0 subject
in role 1 only depend on the game position of that player and not on Bob’s reasoning path leading to player 1.
This simplifying assumption on the highly complex belief system allows us to have a tractable model with belief
heterogeneity within-subjects.
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The main purpose of our paper is the estimation of the unknown population beliefs about
level-0 players from laboratory choices in anchored guessing games. As an illustration, we show in
Figure 1 our estimation outcome for the pooled data (over six treatments of p) of Brañas-Garza,










































































Figure 1: Estimation outcome for the pooled data of Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz and Hernán González
(2012). Top-left: estimated distribution of reasoning levels. Top-right: estimated distribution of aver-
age beliefs about level-0 choices. Bottom-left: estimated play of level-0 players. Bottom-right: stacked
histogram of actual choices (p = 2/3 only) by estimated reasoning level.
The top-right panel highlights that the estimated free-form distribution of beliefs about level-0
choices consists of various peaks. The main peak is at 100. Further peaks can be identified at
50, 40, and 80. The estimated belief distribution turns out to be clustered around these peaks.
Note that a peak represents a focal point, that is, a starting seed for a subject’s reasoning process.
For example, 24% of the choices associated with a strictly positive reasoning level have a seed at
100. The level-2 choice for this seed when p = 2/3 is (2/3)2 · 100 = 44.44. Associated with this
belief distribution is the estimated distribution of reasoning levels in the top-left panel. We can
7Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz and Hernán González (2012) analyze how personal characteristics such as atten-
tion, proxied by performance in the cognitive reflection test, and visual reasoning, measured by Raven’s progressive
matrices, affect behavior in beauty contest games. In total, there are 1146 choices from 191 subjects who play all
six treatments.
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see that 55% of the guesses are considered level-0 and 38% level-1 play, but a few choices have
a rather high reasoning level as well. Since the four above-mentioned seeds of 100, 50, 40, and
80 alone account for 47% of all beliefs of subjects with a non-zero reasoning level and since the
estimated fraction of level-0 subjects is 55%, these seeds explain 47% · 45% = 21% of all choices
in the data set. The bottom-left panel shows the estimated level-0 choices. These are the choices
that are not generated from the estimated beliefs. Finally, the bottom-right panel analyzes the
degree to which each reasoning level explains the data. It can be observed that the algorithm
does not assign each choice to its maximum compatible reasoning level. For instance, in the first
bar of this histogram, which contains all choices in the interval [0,5), the two lowest reasoning
levels explain about 70% of these choices, while levels of 8 and beyond explain about 30%. With
this brief illustration, the reader should have a clear idea about the objectives and the output
of the estimation procedure. In Section 5, we apply our approach to the data of the newspaper
experiments of Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002) and to one of the anchored
guessing games of Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021).
We next detail our estimation technique. For that assume that choices from a large player-
2 population have been collected in the introductory example. The corresponding beliefs to be






3 ). This vector produces,
through the reduced-form equations, for all non-zero reasoning levels the random variables of








3 ). For simplicity, we remove the (player role) index
2 and write ẽ and x̃k instead of ẽ(2) and x̃k2. The central building block is a mixture model that
consists of
1. Level composition: p0, p1, . . . , pK are the unknown fractions (to be estimated) of each
reasoning level in the player-2 population. The maximum reasoning level allowed for in the
estimation is K.
2. Density functions: f 0, f 1, . . . , fK are the unknown density functions of x̃0, x̃1, . . . , x̃K . The
only condition imposed is that fk has domain [0, (2/3)k ·100]. For each reasoning level k ≥ 0,
fk is approximated by B rectangular buckets with areas ak1, a
k
2, . . . , a
k
B that add up to 1 (to
be estimated).
The idea underlying the mixture model is that the density function of the observed data is
a convex combination of the densities f 0, f 1, . . . , fK with weights p0, p1, . . . , pK . The mixture
model can then be solved by using maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The key technical
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challenge that arises is the introduction of the game-theoretical restrictions into the mixture model.
One possible approach is to consider the full set of reduced-form equations for all non-zero levels.
Since the mixture model then becomes hard to implement and computationally intractable for
general anchored guessing games, we instead impose well-founded game-theoretical conditions that
approximate the reduced-form equations. This leads to an easy implementation and a quick and
consistent estimation. One further benefit is that a severe identification problem of beliefs is
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Our theoretical results will allow us to assume in the estimation that for all buckets b =
1, 2, . . . , B, we have that a1b = a
2
b = · · · = aKb ≡ ab. That is, bucket areas are equal across all
non-zero levels. This condition is equivalent to what we call a common shape of the random
variables x̃1, x̃2, . . . , x̃K . As a consequence, the set of bucket areas to be estimated is reduced to
a01, a
0
2, . . . , a
0
B and a1, a2, . . . , aB. The resulting implication in the introductory example is that for














where µ̃ is the random variable of average beliefs of player 2. Observe that the before-mentioned
identification problem is now circumvented: the estimated bucket areas a1, a2, . . . , aB in fact define
the density function of the average beliefs µ̃, which is a one-dimensional proxy of ẽ. For example,
a level-2 choice of 32 is now unambiguously explained by the average belief 32 · (2/3)−2 = 72.
We are now ready to outline the theoretical foundations that justify this approximation of
x̃k, k ≥ 1, through µ̃. The key assumption is that for all reasoning levels k ≥ 1, the random
vector of beliefs ẽ is independent of k, i.e., Alice and Bob may have different beliefs about level-0
behavior for reasons that are not related with their different reasoning levels. The majority of
level-k models implicitly operate under this assumption. Theorem 1 provides conditions under
which the approximation is exact. It establishes that if beliefs are homogeneous within subjects




2 = . . . = e
(s)
n ), then the optimal choice distributions x̃1, x̃2, . . . , x̃K
have exactly the same shape as µ̃, that is, their distribution functions are the same after a suitable
affine transformation of the random variables. In our example, this transformation rescales each
x̃k from the domain [0, (2/3)k ·100] to [0, 100]. Closest to Theorem 1 is the result of Burchardi and
Penczynski (2014), who estimate beliefs in the beauty contest game under the assumption that
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beliefs are homogenous within subjects and follow a normal distribution. Our result is distribution-
free and applies to the more general class of anchored guessing games. Second, Theorem 2 obtains
a weaker result, similarity of shapes instead of shape equality, by dropping the assumption of
homogenous beliefs within subjects. It shows that as the reasoning level k increases, the shape
of x̃k approximates the shape of µ̃. Theorem 2 also establishes that the shape of x̃k approaches
towards the shape of µ̃ faster in games with a low eigenvalue ratio.8 Consequently, if one cannot
rely on belief homogeneity within subjects, the estimation is more consistent for games with a lower
eigenvalue ratio by virtue of Theorem 2 because shapes become more similar at earlier reasoning
levels. In the introductory example, when allowing for an arbitrary number of players, this ratio
is (n − 1)−1, which is independent of p. Hence, our estimation procedure, which assumes equal
shapes across non-zero levels, should yield more consistent results for n = 6 than for n = 3.
Figure 2: Theoretical choice distributions in the introductory example (x̃1 in orange, x̃2 in green, and
µ̃ in blue) re-normalized to [0, 100]. The beliefs ẽ1, ẽ2, . . . , ẽn about level-0 choices are independently and
uniformly distributed on [0, 100]. In the panel to the right, it is difficult to visually distinguish x̃2 and µ̃
from each other.
Finally, we derive a new central limit result that provides a microfoundation for gaussian
mixture models commonly used in the level-k literature. Proposition 2 complements Theorem 2
by showing that the choice distributions for k ≥ 1 converge towards normal distributions as n
grows, as long as the components of the random vector ẽ are independently (but not necessarily
identically) distributed and as long as no player receives too much weight in the targets of other
players. Our example satisfies the latter condition because players assign the same weight to all
opponents in their targets. The effects of combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 2 can be visually
8This is the absolute value of the ratio between the second and the first eigenvalue of the matrix that represents
the strategic dependencies of the game. It is a rough measure of the balancedness of the link distribution in the
dependency network. For instance, Golub and Jackson (2012) use the second eigenvalue to measure homophily in
a network, which affects the speed of convergence to consensus.
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appreciated in Figure 2. It can be seen that as n increases, the choice distributions have more
similar shapes due to Theorem 2 and are normally distributed due to Proposition 2.
The level-k model has received considerable attention. The main insight from the early ex-
perimental studies of guessing games in Nagel (1995), Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998), Bosch-
Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002), and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) as well
as from the normal-form game experiments in Stahl and Wilson (1994,1995) and Costa-Gomes,
Crawford and Broseta (2001) is that a substantial fraction of the non-equilibrium play is consis-
tent with k-rationalizability for low levels of k (k ≤ 3) if level-0 subjects are assumed to choose
uniformly at random over the entire action space.9 However, according to Crawford, Costa-Gomes
and Iriberri (2013) “More work is needed to evaluate the credibility of the models’ explanations
and to assess their domains of applicability, their portability, and the stability of their parameter
estimates across types of games.”10 Not only is the class of anchored guessing games a generalized
framework that is ideally suited to compare parameter estimates across different game specifi-
cations; more importantly, we develop the microfoundation for a new non-parametric estimation
technique that extracts beliefs about the level-0 players directly from the choice data. Our ap-
proach therefore complements others in which information about beliefs could be obtained with the
help of alternative experimental designs. For instance, Bhatt and Camerer (2005) extract reason-
ing levels via fMRI; Costa-Gomes and Weizäcker (2008) ask subjects to state their beliefs; Wang,
Spezio and Camerer (2010) use eyetracking devices to monitor subjects’ decisions; Burchardi and
Penczynski (2014) use group chat protocols from team decisions and Fragiadakis, Kovaliukaite and
Rojo-Arjona (2019) use an incentive compatible mechanism to elicit beliefs.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the class of all anchored guessing games and
study their equilibrium properties. Section 3 introduces the formal level-k framework and derives
the theoretical results regarding shape equality/similarity and normality. Section 4 describes the
algorithm with which we estimate population beliefs about the behavior of level-0 players. This
maximum likelihood estimation technique is applied in Section 5 to data from various experiments.
Finally, in the concluding discussion, we illustrate how our results can be helpful for designing
laboratory guessing games. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
9Recently, Agranov, Potamites, Schotter and Tegiman (2012), Georganas Healy and Weber (2015), and Aloui
and Penta (2016) introduce the notion of a strategic bound. A player with bound k̄ strategically chooses the
reasoning level k ≤ k̄ at which she operates. We abstain from these game-theoretical considerations.
10Among others, the level-k model has been applied to strategic information transmission by Cai and Wang
(2006), auctions and hide and seek games by Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b), the 11-20 game by Arad and
Rubinstein (2012), and the centipede game by García-Pola, Iriberri and Kovářík (2020).
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2 Anchored guessing games
Example 1.
Consider the following simultaneous move game. There are two players i ∈ {1, 2}. Each player i
has to choose a number xi from the interval [0,100].
The first player’s target guess t1 is the average of 10 and the choice x2 of player 2.
The second player’s target guess t2 is the average of 40 and the choice x1 of player 1.
Players have the incentive to minimize the distance between their choices and target guesses. This
game has a very simple graphical representation. In the diagram, nodes are players and cells are
numbers that we call anchors. Arrows departing from a player point to the information used to

















The unique equilibrium is x∗ = (20, 30), which is the unique solution of the linear system
x1 = t1 =
x2 + 10
2




This completes the example 
We are ready to introduce the formal model. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of n players.
Players have to simultaneously and independently choose a number from the interval X ≡ [x, x] ⊆
R, where x > x.11 Let xi ∈ X be a particular strategy for player i. The column vector x =
(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be a strategy vector. The n×n non-negative matrix W with generic element
wij describes the network of strategic dependencies between players. For example, if n = 3 and
the objective of player 1 is to guess the average of x2 and x3, then w12 = w13 = 0.5. The element
11The strategy space is assumed to be common exclusively for notational simplicity. The model and results can
be adapted in a straightforward way to allow for heterogeneous strategy spaces.
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wii may or may not be equal to zero. If W has a zero main diagonal, as in Example 1, then we
say that the game is represented in its best-reply form. The targets do not only depend on the
strategies of other players, but also on constants. Formally, there is a non-empty set of anchors
M = {1, . . . ,m} with an associated m × 1 vector of real anchor values v = (v1, . . . , vm)⊤ ∈ Rm.
Anchor values enter into the players’ objectives through the n×m non-negative matrix A, which
describes how much weight each player assigns to each of the m anchor values. By convention, if
there are no anchors, we set m = 1 and take A to be an n× 1 vector of zeroes 0 and v the 1× 1










Expressed in matrix form, targets are thus
t(x) = Av +Wx.
The utility function of player i ∈ N is ui(x) = − (xi − ti(x))2 . Let 1 be the vector of ones. Targets
are said to always be within the strategic bounds if for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ Xn, ti(x) ∈ [x, x]. We
concentrate throughout on games that satisfy this interiority requirement, which can be succinctly
written as follows.
Assumption 1 (Interiority). x (I−W)1 ≤ Av ≤ x (I−W)1.
While Assumption 1 is restrictive, it still leaves a lot of room for designing meaningful laboratory
guessing games.12 The class of all simultaneous move games (N,Xn, (ui)i∈N), parametrized by x,
x, W, A, and v, that satisfy interiority are called anchored guessing games.
Order the (possibly complex) eigenvalues of W by their absolute value, i.e., |λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥ . . . ≥
|λn|. Since W is non-negative, it is well-known that λ1 ≥ 0. Also, by Assumption 1, λ1 ≤ 1 and
each row sum of W is less than or equal to one (see, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 shows that there always is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium
is unique if and only if λ1 < 1. Proposition 1 provides for all anchored guessing games an ordinal
characterization of this condition. For this purpose, we say that player i ∈ N has a path to an
anchor if there is a sequence of players (i = j0, j1, j2, . . . , jk = j) such that
∑
l∈N wjl < 1 and for all
12For instance, given a desired dependency matrix W and a desired strategy space X, one can always find a set
of anchors A with values v so that the interiority assumption holds. Or, given a desired dependency matrix W and
a set of anchors A with values v, one can always find a desired strategy space X so that the interiority assumption
holds.
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s = 1, 2, . . . , k, wjs−1js > 0. That is, player i has a path leading to a player j ∈ N (not necessarily
distinct from i) whose row sum
∑
l wjl is strictly smaller than 1. This condition is essentially
graph-theoretical (i.e., ordinal) in the sense that only the existence of links in the graph matter,
but not the particular weights.
Proposition 1.
(a) Every anchored guessing game has Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).
(b) The equilibrium is unique if and only if every player i ∈ N has a path to an anchor.
(c) If the equilibrium is unique, then x∗ = (I−W)−1Av.
(d) If the equilibrium is unique, then it is globally stable, dominance solvable, and it can be
obtained by applying to any initial vector of guesses x0 = (x01, . . . , x
0
n)
⊤ the iterative vector
function
x
τ+1 = t(xτ ), where τ = 0, 1, . . . .
Proposition 1 follows from standard results. Since the game is smooth supermodular, existence
follows from Milgrom and Roberts (1990). The ordinal characterization is useful because unique-
ness can be checked by merely inspecting the network of strategic dependencies. The asymptotic
convergence factor of the iterative process xτ+1 = t(xτ ) towards x∗ is λ1 and, therefore, a smaller
dominant eigenvalue λ1 is associated with a higher speed of convergence of this process to the
unique equilibrium. Finally, all results in Proposition 1 except for speed of convergence are robust
to changes in the targets t whenever the underlying best-reply mapping remains unaffected. We
conclude with another example.
Example 2 (beauty contest game).
Let there be n players. The strategy space is X = [0, x]n, where x > 0. Target guesses are equal
to a fraction p ≥ 0 of the average guess, that is, ti = (p/n)
∑
j∈N xj. Thus, v = (0), A = 0, and
W = (p/n)U, where U = 11⊤ is an n× n matrix of ones. It is easy to check that the interiority
assumption is satisfied if and only if p ≤ 1. Since the dominant eigenvalue of W is λ1 = p, the
equilibrium is unique if and only if p < 1. Observe that the asymptotic speed of convergence to
equilibrium is decreasing in p and that it does not depend on the number of players. Section 3




In the level-k model, each player is endowed with a reasoning level k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. A player
with reasoning level k = 0 chooses any number from X. We do not make any assumption on the
behavior of level-0 players. A player with reasoning level k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is defined recursively as one
who best replies to the subjective belief that all other players employ reasoning level k − 1. This
creates a belief hierarchy that collapses at level 0. We also note that the actual level-0 behavior
may differ from the beliefs that players hold about level-0.
In order to introduce our results, suppose that a large number of experimental subjects are
randomly assigned into groups of n to play a given anchored guessing game. From an econometric
point of view, each experimental subject s is endowed with an observable role i ∈ N , an unob-
servable reasoning level k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and unobservable beliefs e(s) = (e(s)1 , . . . , e(s)n ) ∈ [x, x]n.
Here, e
(s)
j ∈ [x, x] denotes the belief of subject s about the play of a level-0 subject in role j.13 The
random vector ẽ = (ẽ1, . . . , ẽn) gathers the beliefs of all subjects in the population. Denote the
restriction of ẽ to any given role i ∈ N by ẽ(i). Also, define the average beliefs of the subjects in role




j , where γ is a vector of non-negative weights that add up to 1. It is assumed
throughout that for all non-zero reasoning levels, ẽ(i) is independent k. This assumption, which
is implicit in much of the level-k literature, turns out to be crucial for our estimation strategy in
Section 4.
Assumption 2 (Level-independent beliefs). For all roles, beliefs are independent of non-zero
reasoning levels. That is, for all i ∈ N , e ∈ [x, x]n and all k, k′ ≥ 1,
Pr(ẽ(i) ≤ e | k) = Pr(ẽ(i) ≤ e | k′)
We next derive the optimal choices under the level-k model. Subject s with reasoning level
k ≥ 1 in role i solves the following vector iterative process:
x
1(s) = Av +We(s) and (1)
x
τ(s) = t(x(τ−1)(s)) = Av +Wx(τ−1)(s) for all τ ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k}.
13More concretely, the subjective beliefs over level-0 play are a probability distribution over X. Due to the
linearity of the targets, an expected utility maximizing subject only considers the mathematical expectation of this
probability distribution. Hence, formally e
(s)
j is the mathematical expectation of the subjective beliefs.
13
The optimal choice x
k(s)
i of subject s corresponds to the i-th entry of the k-th iteration vector
x
k(s). Let x̃ki be the random variable induced by the optimal choices of all subjects with reasoning
level k in role i. Since x̃ki depends (linearly) on the beliefs ẽ
(i), we write x̃ki = x
k
i (ẽ
(i)) to make this
dependence explicit. We refer to x̃ki = x
k
i (ẽ
(i)), k ≥ 1, as reduced-form equations.
By Proposition 1, if there is a unique equilibrium x∗, x̃ki degenerates towards x
∗
i as k grows. The
speed of convergence depends inversely on the dominant eigenvalue λ1 of W. We thus highlight
here the importance of λ1 as a crucial parameter in anchored guessing games under the level-k
model because it helps delimiting scenarios where the level-k theory can explain out-of-equilibrium
behavior. For instance, the level-k model is more likely to explain out-of-equilibrium behavior of
players with moderate levels of reasoning in games with a high λ1 (because these games converge
slower). Also, note that x̃ki lies necessarily within the set of k-iterated undominated strategies
Uki ≡ [xki , xki ]. Due to Assumption 1 the bounds xki and xki can be computed from the iterative
formula in (1) by substituting the initial vector e(s) by x1 and x1, respectively. The bounds of Uki
then correspond to the i-th entries of the k-th iteration vectors.
3.2 Main results
Our main purpose is to estimate, given the choices of the subjects in a given role i ∈ N , the features
of the beliefs ẽ(i). From a theoretical point of view, we are interested in analyzing conditions on
the game characteristics and on the beliefs so that the “shapes” of the distributions x̃ki , k ≥ 1, are
alike. Formally, consider two real random variables ỹ and z̃, and two domain intervals [y, y] and
[z, z] that contain the supports of ỹ and z̃, respectively. We say that ỹ and z̃ are equally shaped,
written ỹ
S






z − z .
The geometric interpretation of the condition is that the probability distribution functions of ỹ and
z̃ have exactly the same visual form within their respective domains (they are affine transformations
of each other).14 Let {ỹk}∞k=1 be a sequence of random variables defined on the domains {[yk, yk]}∞k=1
and let ỹ be a random variable with given domain [y, y]. We say that the random variables {ỹk}∞k=1








Our definition is stronger than this notion because it is parametrized by the given domain intervals.
14





y − y as k → ∞.
We write ỹk
S→ ỹ to denote that the shape of ỹk approaches towards the shape of ỹ as k grows.15
Theorems 1 and 2 establish that under suitable conditions, the population choices x̃ki have
for k ≥ 1 the same or similar shapes as the average beliefs µ̃(i). Hence, if one knew the choice
distribution of the level-1 subjects in role i, then one would only need to rescale and shift this
distribution in order obtain the choice distributions for all reasoning levels k > 1 for the same role
i. In Theorem 1, equal shapes are the consequence of imposing restrictions on beliefs. Formally,
the beliefs ẽ(i) are said to be individually homogeneous if for each subject s in role i ∈ N , e(s)1 =
e
(s)
2 = . . . = e
(s)
n ≡ e(s). In other words, if beliefs are individually homogeneous, then the random
belief vector ẽ(i) is equal to µ̃(i)1 for any weight vector γ. Note that beliefs remain nevertheless
heterogeneous between subjects because two different subjects s and s′ may think differently about
how level-0 subjects behave. Observe that while x̃ki has domain U
k
i , µ̃
(i) has domain [x, x].
Theorem 1. Suppose that all subjects in role i ∈ N have individually homogenous beliefs. Then,
the random variables {x̃ki }∞k=1 are equal in shape. In particular, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, x̃ki
S
= µ̃(i).
Next, we analyze the case when beliefs are not assumed to be individually homogenous. We
assume for simplicity that W is diagonalizable, which holds generically. To proceed, the following
graph-theoretical definitions are needed. An anchored guessing game is said to be connected if the
dependency matrix W is irreducible, that is, if any two players can be connected by some path
in the network represented by W. The matrix W is primitive16 if there is some integer k > 0
such that all entries of Wk are strictly positive. It is well-known that if W is primitive, then the
corresponding anchored guessing game is connected.
Theorem 2 guarantees shape convergence whenever the underlying dependency matrix W is
primitive without imposing any condition on beliefs. The shape of the choice distribution x̃ki
15Convergence in distribution (
D→) to a non-degenerate random variable is a special case of convergence in shape
with suitably defined domains. For instance, U(0, 1 + 1/k) S→ U(0, 1) when the domains are the corresponding
supports of the uniform distributions (in fact, the shapes are equal). However, we stress the importance of imposing
a non-degenerate limit random variable ỹ. For instance, U(0, 1/k) converges in distribution to the degenerate
random variable 0. However, U(0, 1/k) does not converge in shape to any degenerate random variable. In fact, for
each k, the shape of U(0, 1/k) is equal to the shape of U(0, 1) with corresponding domains [0, 1/k] and [0, 1]. In this
sense, convergence in shape to ỹ means convergence in shape to the whole class of random variables that have the
same shape as ỹ.
16Primitive matrices are generic. Even if W has a zero diagonal, primitivity remains generic for n ≥ 3.
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j , where the weight γj assigned to
each role j ∈ N is precisely the centrality of player j in the network induced by W. The centrality
vector γ is computed as the left eigenvector (with
∑
j γj = 1) associated with the dominant
eigenvalue λ1 of W. That is, γ
⊤
W = λ1 γ
⊤. The centrality γj summarizes the influence of role j
on the choices of all players.
Theorem 2. Suppose that W is primitive. Then, for each role i ∈ N , the random variables
{x̃ki }∞k=1 converge in shape. In particular, x̃ki
S−→ µ̃(i) as k → ∞.
The asymptotic convergence factor of this result is given by the eigenvalue ratio |λ2|/λ1 < 1. An
extreme case of Theorem 2 occurs when W has rank one and can thus be written as W = r · γ⊤.
The shape of the choice distributions of non-zero levels then turn out to be equal to µ̃ because the
eigenvalue ratio is 0. The beauty contest game of Example 2 has an associated rank-one matrix
W with r = p1 and γ = (1/n)1.
We also highlight that Theorem 2 provides insights about the proper design of anchored guessing
games for the laboratory because games with a low eigenvalue ratio |λ2|/λ1 are those for which
shape convergence may be observed at the earliest non-zero reasoning levels.17 Our simulations
show that an eigenvalue ratio of 0.65 seems generally low enough to obtain similar shapes starting at
levels 1 or 2.18 Under these circumstances it is therefore more justified to impose in the econometric
analysis developed in Section 4 that the choice distributions of non-zero levels are equally shaped.
As an illustration, consider the beauty contest game with at least three players in its best-reply
form (zero main diagonal) and targets ti(x) = p/(n − p)
∑
j 6=i xj. Also, suppose that beliefs are
not assumed individually homogenous. Then, W is primitive and Theorem 2 applies (but not
Theorem 1). It follows from the anonymity of the interactions that γ of W is the uniform vector





j /n. Moreover, the eigenvalue
ratio |λ2|/λ1 = (n − 1)−1 is bounded above by 0.5 when there are at least three players, which
facilitates similar shapes at early reasoning levels.
17In the discussion section, we address this design problem by comparing a variety of games with n ≤ 4.
18Convergence in shape is not only determined by the eigenvalue ratio, which should be interpreted as an optimistic
measure of convergence, it is also affected by the random vector of beliefs ẽ(i) as well as by other graph-theoretical
features like the diameter of the network associated with the dependency matrix W.
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3.3 Large games
In this part, we study games with a growing number of players. Proposition 2 below identifies
conditions under which each x̃ki approximates a truncated normal distribution. The proposition
thus rationalizes the application of parametric gaussian estimation techniques in certain types
of anchored guessing games. For example, Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (1998) and Burchardi and
Penczynski (2014) assume that a normal distribution for level-0 choices or beliefs is transmitted to
all non-zero reasoning levels. In our setting, normality arises naturally without making this kind
of assumption. Two types of convergences take place under our result. First, the random variables
x̃ki and µ̃ have a similar shape by Theorem 2. Second, µ̃ is distributed normally as n grows by a
central limit theorem.
We introduce the necessary notation and definitions. Given role i ∈ N , beliefs are said to be




2 , . . . , ẽ
(i)
n are independently (but not necessarily
identically) distributed. Since role-independence implies that beliefs are not individually homoge-
nous, this condition is incompatible with Theorem 1. We thus have to build the central limit result





j . Let γ = maxj{γj} be the maximum network centrality, Var(ẽ(i)j ) be
the variance of the beliefs subjects in role i have about the play of level-0 subjects in role j, and
γ̄j = γj/γ ∈ [0, 1] be the centrality of role j relative to the maximum centrality. In the context of
a growing network all parameters and variables associated with the game, except for the strategy
space, like W, ẽ(i), γ, γ̄j, and x̃
k
i , may vary with the size of the network n. However, in order to
keep the notation as simple as possible, we abstain from making theses dependencies explicit.
Proposition 2. Consider any role i ∈ N and suppose that W is primitive for all n ≥ 1. If beliefs






j ) → ∞ as n → ∞, then x̃ki is asymptotically normal.
In particular,
x̃ki






















as k, n → ∞,





To see why role independence is a necessary condition imagine an extreme case where beliefs
are individually homogeneous with ẽ(i) ∼ U(x, x). Then, by Theorem 1, choices are uniformly (i.e.,




j ) does not vanish too fast (if it vanishes) as n grows. In fact, without enough
belief variability, it would be difficult to obtain normally distributed choices when these are mixed
in the average belief µ̃(i). Second, no player should have an excessive impact on the targets of
other players, that is, as n grows, there is no role j whose centrality γj becomes large compared to
that of the other roles. Corollary 1 below illustrates this point when the belief variance is bounded
away from zero: normality arises when the maximum centrality γ vanishes faster than n−1/2.
Corollary 1. Consider any role i ∈ N and suppose that W is primitive for all n ≥ 1. If beliefs
are role-independent, if there is ε > 0 independent of n such that for all j ∈ N , Var(ẽ(i)j ) ≥ ε as
n → ∞, and if limn→∞ γ
√
n = 0, then x̃ki is asymptotically normal as k, n → ∞.
A simple scenario of a moderate maximum influence, which includes the beauty contest game
with at least three players, occurs when W approaches towards a column-regular matrix, i.e., there
is c > 0 such that 1⊤W → c1⊤ as n → ∞. Then, for all j ∈ N , we have that γj ≃ γ ≃ 1/n for
large n, which vanishes sufficiently fast. More generally, anonymous games (i.e., games where roles
cannot be distinguished from each other in the network W) satisfy the conditions of Corollary 1.
4 Maximum likelihood estimation
We propose a mixture model, whose components are the different reasoning levels, in order to
non-parametrically infer the beliefs about the behavior of level-0 subjects. By Theorem 1 or
by Theorem 2, the choice distributions x̃ki of all non-zero levels are assumed to have the same
shape as the average beliefs µ̃. Since these choice distributions only differ in known scale and
shift parameters from each other, we therefore implicitly accomplish our goal of estimating the
distribution of average beliefs. Formally, let xl, l = 1, ..., L, be a typical observation or choice.
For notational simplicity, it is assumed that all choices belong to the same role i ∈ N in a given
anchored guessing game. Since the role is fixed, we suppress the index i throughout this section.













K denotes the maximum reasoning level considered in the estimation, pk ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to
the (unknown and to be estimated) fraction of observations that are generated by subjects with
reasoning level k, and fk is the (unknown and to be estimated) conditional density function that
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describes the choices of the level-k subjects. Regarding f 0, we consider first what we call an L0-
unrestricted estimation according to which the density function f 0 forms part of the estimation.
The domain of the density function fk is the k-iterated undominated set Uk = [xk, xk].
The interest of Theorems 1 and 2 lies in that they produce shape restrictions that reduce the
number of unknown density functions from K+1 to 2 (f 0 and f). In particular, by applying either













if x ∈ Uk
0 otherwise.
(2)
The unknown density f with domain [x, x] corresponds to the average beliefs µ̃. Given an obser-
vation x, let k(x) be the highest k such that x ∈ Uk. So, k(x) is the maximum reasoning level























We approximate the density functions by partitioning their domains in a precise way that takes
advantage of our theoretical results. In particular, each set of undominated strategies Uk = [xk, xk]
is divided into a total of B buckets of equal width (xk − xk)/B. These buckets form a histogram
that approximates the density function fk. The non-negative bucket areas (to be estimated) for
reasoning level k are denoted by ak1, a
k
2, . . . , a
k




b = 1. For each observation x and each reasoning level k such that x ∈ Uk, let bk(x) be the
index 1, 2, . . . , B of the bucket that contains x in the histogram of fk. The discrete version of the




















B/(xk−xk) is the height of the bk(xl)-th bucket that indicates the approximated value
of fk(xl). Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to assume equal bucket areas across non-zero levels. That is,
for each bucket b = 1, 2 . . . , B, we have that a1b = a
2
b = · · · = aKb ≡ ab. The log-likelihood function





























where ∆r is the r-dimensional simplex. The total number of parameters to be estimated is K +
2(B − 1), which is possibly a large number.
We adapt the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm to solve the maximization problem
(3) iteratively. The maximization problem is generally difficult to solve, yet since we can rely in the
M-step on closed-form formulae rather than on solving an interim maximization program, it turns
out that the algorithm is very fast in practice. The algorithm typically yields a local maximum
for any arbitrary starting point and, due to the efficient implementation, it can be executed many
times producing in this way a set of local maxima that can be further analyzed. In the following,
superscript [t] denotes the current parameter value at time t during the execution of the algorithm.









Then, at time t = 0, 1, . . . , repeat the following two steps until the distance between two consecutive
solutions reaches a desired tolerance level:
• E-step (expectation).
Given the iteration t density functions f 0[t](xl) = a
0[t]
b0(xl)



















The parameters are updated.19,20












































19It can be shown that the the closed-form formulae for level composition and bucket areas given in the M-step

































20When a solution is reached after a high number of iterations T , the probability that the choice x ∈ [x, x] is
generated by the reasoning level k is approximated by q
[T ]
k (x) from the E-step.
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Instead of the L0-unrestricted estimation procedure shown above, one could also make as-
sumptions about the actual behavior of the level-0 subjects. Two types of restricted estimation
procedures seem particularly appealing. In an L0-fixed estimation, a concrete f 0 is imposed. For
example, if level-0 choices are assumed to be uniformly distributed, then we set for all x ∈ [x, x]
and all iterations t, f 0[t](x) = 1/(x− x). Alternatively, in an L0-consistent estimation, the density
f 0 of level-0 play is assumed to be equal to the density f of average beliefs. In this case, the
average beliefs are correct and we substitute a0b by ab for all buckets b = 1, . . . , B and update the















Finally, if Proposition 2 applies, we may adopt a gaussian approach in which the algorithm has
to estimate the parameters µ and σ of the normal density f of average beliefs.21 For the sake of
simplicity in the estimation, we do not truncate the normal distributions. It is important to observe
that gaussian L0-unrestricted estimations generally lead to trivial solutions with p0 = 1 because
B buckets of f 0 tend to explain the data better alone than when mixed with gaussian shapes of
choices with level k ≥ 1. Therefore, we only consider an L0-restricted estimation framework. We
can still consider L0-consistent and L0-fixed estimations. In the equations below, the L0-consistent
estimation corresponds to the model parameter C = 0, while an L0-fixed estimation is obtained if
C = 1. Let
zk(x) = x+
x− x
xk − xk (x− x
k)





k=0 ∈ ∆K , µ[0] ∈ [x, x], and σ[0] > 0. The E-step and M-step for the gaussian estimation
are as follows:
• E-step (expectation).















where for all k ≥ C,
21In typical gaussian mixture models, gaussian level-0 beliefs imply gaussian choices of higher reasoning levels.



















if x ∈ Uk
0 otherwise.
If C = 1, we have f 0[t] = f 0 (fixed ex-ante).
• M-step (maximization).
The parameters are updated.






















































This section estimates the mixture model for the data from the newspaper experiments of Bosch-
Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002), who implement the beauty contest game with
p = 2/3 in the Financial Times (England), Spektrum (Germany), and Expansión (Spain), and
for the first of the three anchored guessing games detailed in Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and
Vorsatz (2021).22 The latter study is tailored as a more direct test of the equilibrium behavior in
Proposition 1 and of whether the estimated beliefs depend on exogenous characteristics such as
gender. In Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021) subjects are asked, using an incentive
compatible mechanism, to register during 8 periods as many choices as they wish to without
receiving feedback regarding the actions or the payoffs of any player.23
22We also performed estimations with the beauty contest dataset of Matthew O. Jackson from his Game Theory
course in Coursera. The results are similar to those obtained in the newspaper experiments, but they are noisier
and the estimation yields, maybe due to the absence of incentives, lower reasoning levels.
23There are also treatments with feedback between periods, which affects subject behavior. We therefore concen-
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0 0 0.25 0 0.25
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∗ = (11, 23, 11, 23)
λ1 = 0.35
Figure 3: Anchored guessing game of Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021).
The targets, induced by means of the matrix in Figure 3, have simple verbal equivalents that
are used in the instructions in order to keep the experiment as simple as possible. Subjects are
also provided with the graphical representation of the strategic dependencies (network structure)
to further simplify the experiment. Players 1 and 3 as well as players 2 and 4 are isomorphic in
the sense that their respective positions in the game are identical. We pool all registered choices
because not much additional insight is gained from separating player roles or periods.
Theorem 1 reasonably applies to Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002) because
their game is anonymous which supports Assumption 2. But one could also make use of Theorem
2 since the eigenvalue ratio (n − 1)−1 is negligible when subjects use best-replies and n is large.
For Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021) we have to impose Assumption 2 in order to
apply Theorem 1. Theorem 2 cannot be used because W is not primitive. We set the maximal
reasoning level to K = 10, approximate the density functions via B = 50 buckets, and fix an error
tolerance of 10−8. The results are quite stable with respect to these choices. Finally, since the
algorithm identifies local maxima for each starting point, we run for each data set a total of 1,000
estimations with random starting points. In most cases, we get one or a few local maximum with
small differences in the value of the log-likelihood function. The global maximum is always the
most common outcome. The reported outcome is the average of these 1,000 estimations.
The results of the L0-unrestricted estimations are presented in Figure 4. The top-left panel
shows the percentages of the subjects that are assigned to the different reasoning levels. We find
that the percentage of level-0 subjects is between 35% and 55%. Some subjects are assigned to the
highest reasoning level in the newspaper experiments, which is different for the anchored guessing
game of Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021), where the highest reasoning level with
positive estimated mass is k = 3. Also, the percentage of level-1 subjects is rather low and smaller
23
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Figure 4: Unrestricted estimation results.
than the percentage of level-2 subjects. However, this has a straightforward explanation that
directly brings us to the top-right panel.
The top-right panel, the main output of the algorithm, shows the estimated average beliefs
about the behavior of level-0 players. The estimated average beliefs are much more concentrated
than the original choice histograms in bottom-right panel, which suggests that subjects usually
start their reasoning process from a few common focal points. To understand the lack of level-1
subjects in the level compositions of the newspapers’ beauty contests, note that many subjects
choose the number 33 in this game. If subjects assume that level-0 play is uniformly distributed on
[0,100], then the average belief is 50 and the choice of 33 is best associated with a level-1 behavior.
24
Since the unrestricted estimations do not make specific assumptions (other than shape similarity)
about the distribution of average beliefs, a guess of 33 is now not only consistent with a level-1
play under the average belief of 50, but also with a level-2 play under the average belief of about
75. In fact, under shape similarity, a single observation of 33 is more likely to be generated by level
2 than by level 1, which illustrates the algorithm’s tendency to assign subjects to higher levels.
To see this, suppose that the average beliefs 50 and 75 are equally likely, that is, f(50) = f(75).











f(50) = f 1(33).
The tendency to assign a guess of 33 in the newspaper experiments to level 2 can be observed
in the top-right panel: instead of a spike at 50, a lot of mass is assigned to the 70-80 range. With
respect to Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021), about 50% of the subjects with a non-
zero reasoning level have an average belief of 80. This suggests that the unique anchor of the game
description is a strong focal point in the belief formation process. Moreover, about 20% of these
subjects have an average belief of 0, which may be caused by the fact that this number involves
simpler calculations. Since 50% of all choices are level-0 play in this game (see, the top-left panel),
the seeds of 80 and 0 explain about 35% of all choices.
The estimated behavior of the level-0 players in the bottom-left panel is interpreted as the
residual of observations that the algorithm cannot explain by higher reasoning levels. Notably,
the distributions are not uniformly distributed. Hence, for the data at hand, the outcome of
the L0-restricted estimations, which we detail below and which assume that level-0 subjects play
uniformly at random, might differ from what we find for the L0-unrestricted estimations.
The stacked histograms in the bottom-right panel show for every range of guesses, the percent-
age of choices in that range that correspond to each level. These percentages are obtained from
the E-step after the execution of the algorithm. For example, in case of the newspaper experiment
in the Financial Times, it turns out that choices below 15 come predominantly from subjects with
a reasoning level k ≥ 6, whereas for the Spektrum and Expansión treatments, choices in this range
are partly attributed to level-0 subjects. For Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021), the
interior equilibrium causes that the choices between 10 and 30 are mainly assigned to subjects
with a relatively higher reasoning level and that choices close to the extremes of the action space
correspond almost exclusively to level-0 subjects.
Figure 5 presents the results of the L0-fixed estimations when level-0 play is distributed uni-
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Figure 5: Restricted estimation results.
formly on the interval [0, 100] (see, bottom-left panel). If we compare Figures 4 and 5, then it
is evident that the level composition in the top-left panel changes substantially. Most strikingly,
the percentage of level-0 subjects in the population is now much lower. The level composition has
consequently a tendency to shift upwards for the L0-fixed estimation. An important question to
be answered is whether the change in the level composition between the estimation procedures
is mainly due to the different behavior of the level-0 subjects or whether this model assumption
causes the estimated behavior of subjects with a higher reasoning level to be different. A compar-
ison of the corresponding top-right panel is helpful in providing an answer to this question. One
observes that the estimated average beliefs is rather robust between estimation procedures. The
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estimated histograms display peaks at similar locations under both methodologies, with a slightly
less clustered distribution in the L0-fixed estimation. The explanation for the reduced clustering
of the L0-fixed estimation is that this procedure is generally forced to classify more observations
above level 0, which implies that the algorithm needs to figure out new beliefs that can generate
the new observations that are not level 0. Hence, the shape of the non-zero choice distributions
does not vary too much between the two approaches and the differences in the level composition
seems to be mainly driven by the level-0 subjects themselves.
Finally, Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2010) estimate a mixture model for
the data from the newspaper experiments using generalized beta distributions when level-0 play
is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,100], the estimated distributions are anchored at the
theoretical play, the width of the support of the distributions is exogenous and equal to 20, and
beliefs about level-0 play are common and set to 50 or 100, respectively. They find for the pooled
data that about 30% of the subjects are level-0, about 10% are level-1, about 20% are level-
2, and about 40% are level-∞. Our L0-fixed estimations assign between 15% and 20% of the
choices to level-0 play, but finds similar percentages of level-1 and level-2 guesses as in Bosch-
Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2010). A direct comparison of higher levels play is not
possible because Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2010) pool all remaining levels
at infinity. Even though our methodology also relies on a mixture model, the results between
the two studies are still hard to compare because the density functions of the mixture model are
defined on completely different domains.
Concluding discussion
This paper contributes to the literature on strategic models of bounded rationality and, in par-
ticular, on the level-k model, by proposing for a general class of guessing games a new maximum
likelihood estimation procedure that uncovers the belief structure that underlies actual choices
and by deriving the microeconomic/statistical foundations of this econometric approach. Section
2 generalizes beauty contest games, which have been widely applied in laboratory experiments,
by allowing for asymmetries and constants in the players’ best reply functions. These anchored
guessing games have a natural visualization in terms of networks. It is worth mentioning in this
respect that the characterization of equilibrium uniqueness in Proposition 1 is ordinal (i.e. purely
graph-theoretical). Section 3 studies the optimal choices under the level-k framework and derives
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the foundations of our estimation technique. Throughout, the central assumption is that beliefs
are independent of reasoning levels. We then find that if each subject assigns the same belief to all
level-0 players in all roles, then the random variables that collect the optimal level-k choices must
have exactly the same shape as the unknown distribution of average beliefs (Theorem 1). Said
differently, the distribution of optimal level-k choices can be remapped to obtain the distribution
of average beliefs by simply applying scale and shift parameters to its associated domain of serially
undominated strategies. If beliefs are not individually homogenous, the shape of the level-k choice
distribution approaches towards the shape of average beliefs (Theorem 2). We also provide extra
conditions on Theorem 2 so that the distribution is normal as the number of players grows (Propo-
sition 2). Section 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimation procedure of a mixture model
with a free-form belief distribution when, due to Theorem 1 or Theorem 2, the choice distributions
of all non-zero levels are assumed to have the same shape as the average beliefs. We solve the
maximization problem iteratively with the help of the expectation maximization algorithm, which
turns out to be fast since we can rely in the maximization step on a closed-form formulae. Finally,
we apply the estimation technique to the data of Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra
(2002) and Ballester, Rodriguez-Moral and Vorsatz (2021). We identify clustered beliefs in both
data sets. Two main focal points appear for the anchored guessing game of Ballester, Rodriguez-
Moral and Vorsatz (2021). The first focal point is 80, which is precisely the unique anchor value
of the game. The second focal point is 0, which is the lower bound of the strategy space.
In the remainder of this section, we adapt a mechanism design perspective. Apart from personal
research interests and other factors like simplicity in terms of the number of player and the number
of connections in the network, the following factors affect the quality of the estimation:
1. Connectedness. If a game is connected (in the associated network, there is a path between
any two players), the choice of a player will potentially be determined by her level-0 beliefs
about all players. Theorem 2 requires that the dependency matrix W is primitive, which
implies connectedness.
2. Eigenvalue ratio |λ2|/λ1. The estimation algorithm assumes common shapes for all reason-
ing levels k ≥ 1, but Theorem 2 applies only in the limit. As we have seen in Section 3, games
with a lower eigenvalue ratio theoretically provide better estimations because convergence
emerges at earlier reasoning levels.
3. Heterogeneity. As the game becomes more heterogeneous in terms of dependencies or
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anchors, it is richer in terms of variability across different roles. However, the assumption of
individually homogeneous beliefs necessary for Theorem 1 is probably harder to sustain as
heterogeneity increases. In those cases, one must rely on Theorem 2 and make sure that the
eigenvalue ratio is moderate. In a similar fashion, if Theorem 2 does not apply (because the
matrix is not primitive or, more generally, the eigenvalue ratio is close to one), one has to
rely entirely on Theorem 1. Anchor value variability should then probably be avoided.
4. Dominant eigenvalue λ1. Recall that lower values of λ1 imply faster convergence towards
the equilibrium as the reasoning level increases. Next, we provide a new result, which shows
that intermediate values of the dominant eigenvalue λ1 may improve the quality of the
estimation. The intuition is simple in the beauty contest game when it is taken into account
that λ1 = p. Suppose that p = 0.1. This has two effects. First, it allows us to classify all
observations in the interval [10, 90] as level 0. Second, it reduces the choice range for all
k ≥ 1 to [0, 10], which can make it difficult to correctly discriminate between these levels
when players make mistakes. The same idea applies when p is too high. If p = 0.9, it not
so easy to classify some choices as low-level. As we show below, p = 2/3 is a compromise
eigenvalue when it is the objective to estimate 4 reasoning levels (K = 3).
To formalize the last point, let the discriminating sets of player i be the disjoint sets
Dki =
{
Uki \ Uk+1i if k < K
UKi if k = K.
For k < K, the k-th discrimination set Dki for a player in role i contains a particular choice
x ∈ X if and only if the maximum reasoning level x can be assigned to is exactly k. And DKi is the
set of choices with a maximum reasoning level of at least K. Intuitively, we would like to jointly
maximize the size of all discriminating sets of all players subject to the interiority condition. For
that, we say that the dependency matrix W admits interiority if x (I−W)1 ≤ x (I−W)1, that
is, if W is substochastic. We fix a baseline non-negative matrix H in the sense that the maximum
of its row sums is one. Then, we solve the maximization problem for games with dependency
matrix W = qH, where q is a scaling factor such that W admits interiority, that is, q ∈ [0, 1].
The dominant eigenvalue of the dependency matrix W is simply λ1(W) = qλ1(H). The following
result assumes that H (and hence W) is regular24, which includes all anonymous games such as
beauty contest games.
24A non-negative matrix S is regular if S1 = s1 for some constant s > 0.
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Proposition 3. Fix a regular baseline matrix H ≥ 0. The optimal scale q̂ that jointly maximizes













The interpretation is that given a baseline H, the associated optimal dependency matrix W =
q̂H has a dominant eigenvalue of (K + 1)/(K + 3) (because λ1(H) = 1 by the regularity of H).
In order to illustrate how the before-mentioned factors may affect the quality of the estimation,
we consider a family of anchored guessing games with two types of players. Players of type A
have one out-link in the network represented by W and are also directly connected to an anchor.
Players of type B have two neighbors in the network W. We assume that x ≤ 0 ≤ x and that the










if i is of type B,
where q > 0 is a parameter, vi is the anchor value of player i of type A, and ij denotes a neighbor
of player i in the dependency network W. It is not difficult to see that the interiority assumption
translates into q ≤ 1 and for any type A player i, vi ∈ [(2− q)x/q, (2− q)x/q].
Figure 6 shows all connected three-player and four-player games in this class. Type A players
are indicated by black dots and type B players by white dots. The games are ordered by the
network structure and the eigenvalue ratio r = |λ2|/λ1. The number of links in the network is e
and the dominant eigenvalue λ1 is shown as a function of the parameter q. For each game in the
figure, q̂ is the value of q that maximizes the objective function of Proposition 3 with K = 3.25
By Proposition 1(b), all games with at least one type A player must have a unique equilibrium
(every player has a path to an anchor). And all games with only type B players have a unique
equilibrium (x∗ = 0) if and only if q < 1. Finally, Theorem 2 only applies if r < 1 (i.e., W is
primitive).26 Interestingly, Theorem 2 cannot be applied to any of the “square” games.
Consider the first game in the second row of all “diamond” games, which consists of two players
of each type. In this game, the eigenvalue ratio is r = 0.62, which is substantially bounded away
from 1 so that shape similarity should ceterus paribus be observed at relatively early non-zero
reasoning levels by Theorem 2. And it should be rather easy for subjects to understand the
25We have numerically solved the maximization problem for each game.
26The second game in the first row of all “diamond” games is an exception because W is not diagonalizable.
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game. The number of links is relatively small (e = 6) and q̂ ≈ 3/4. Finally, setting v1 = 0 and
v2 = 100 does not impose too complex calculations on experimental subjects. This example shows
how Figure 6 can be used to design anchored guessing games for laboratory experiments with
reasonable estimation properties.
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Figure 6: Three-player and four-player anchored guessing games.
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Appendix: Proofs
We establish a couple of auxiliary results before proving Proposition 1. A matrix is (row)-
substochastic if all its entries are non-negative and all row sums are smaller than or equal to 1. If
all row sums are exactly equal to 1, the matrix is called (row)-stochastic.
Lemma 1. For all anchored guessing games, W is row-substochastic.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose by contradiction that W is not row-substochastic. Then, there is
a player i ∈ N for whom ∑j wij ≡ ri > 1. By Assumption 1, x (I−W)1 ≤ Av ≤ x (I−W)1.
Considering the i-th row of this system of equations, we can see that x(1− ri) ≤ x(1− ri). Since
ri > 1, this contradicts the assumption that x < x. 
Lemma 2. For all anchored guessing games, the dominant eigenvalue λ1 of W satisfies λ1 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 2. First, λ1 ≥ 0 because W ≥ 0. Also, λ1 ≤ 1 because (a) λ1 is mono-
tone in W due to Perron-Frobenius theory, (b) λ1 = 1 whenever W is row-stochastic, and (c)
since W is row-substochastic by Lemma 1, it can be obtained by decreasing a stochastic matrix. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) An anchored guessing game is smooth supermodular whenever for all i ∈ N , the strategy
space Xi is a closed interval, the utility function ui is twice continuously differentiable on
Xi, and for all j ∈ N \ {i}, ∂
2ui(x)
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0. Since Xi = [x, x], and ∂
2ui(x)
∂xi∂xj
= 2wij ≥ 0, the game is
smooth supermodular. Equilibrium existence in pure strategies follows from Theorem 5 in
Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
(b) Suppose that every player i ∈ N has a path to an anchor. This, combined with the fact that
W is row-substochastic by Lemma 1, implies that there is an integer k such that all row
sums of Wk are strictly less than 1. The dominant eigenvalue of Wk is λk1 and it is bounded
by the maximum of its row sums. Hence, λk1 < 1. This implies that λ1 < 1. Consequently,
I − W has an inverse. By interiority, every equilibrium x∗ must satisfy x∗ = Av + Wx∗.
Then, x∗ = (I−W)−1Av must be the unique equilibrium.
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Suppose next that some player i ∈ N does not have a path to an anchor. Consider the set
S ⊆ N of all such players. By construction, the square matrix WS, the restriction of W to
the set S, is stochastic. Multiplicity of equilibria is attained as follows. For each c ∈ [x, x],
we construct an equilibrium x∗(c) such that x∗i (c) = c for all i ∈ S. To see this, note that the
interiority assumption restricted to the set S becomes 0 ≤ (Av)S ≤ 0, which implies that
(Av)S = 0, that is, the target of each member of S is a weighted average of choices made
within S. This means that all members of S are best-replying by choosing the number c.
Now, taking this action c as a (possibly) new anchor for players in N \ S, these players choose
their unique equilibrium strategies (since they all have a path to some anchor). Hence, each
choice c by all the members of S determines an equilibrium of the entire game.
(c) Since there is a unique equilibrium by assumption, each player has a path to anchor by part
(b). We have already seen in the proof of part (b) that a player has a path to an anchor
if and only if the dominant eigenvalue λ1 of W is such that λ1 < 1. This implies that the
matrix I −W is invertible. Since best replies are interior by assumption, we have that the
unique solution must be x∗ = (I−W)−1Av.
(d) Iterative convergence and dominance solvability follows from smooth supermodularity and
equilibrium uniqueness. Global stability follows from iterative convergence and equilibrium
uniqueness.
This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let s be a level-k subject playing role i. By the interiority assumption,
for all t ≥ 1,
x
t = Av +Wxt−1
and
x
t = Av +Wxt−1.
By Equation (1),
x





= (e(s) − x)Wk1
and
x







where x0 = x1 and x0 = x1 due to the fact that the strategy space is common, and e(s) = e(s) 1
by individually homogeneous beliefs. Then,
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The optimal choice x
k(s)
i of subject s is the i-th entry of x


















= ẽ(i) for each role i ∈ N . 















































where γj > 0 for all j ∈ N and
∑n
j=1 γj = 1. The limit follows because W is primitive and,
by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, it has a unique dominant eigenvalue λ1 > 0 (λ1 > |λj| for
j = 2, 3, . . . , n) whose associated right and left eigenvectors, r and γ, with
∑n
j=1 γj = 1, are
strictly positive. Thus, for high k, (Wk)ij ∼ C λk1riγj for some constant C > 0 independent of




j is the random variable of average beliefs on the domain [x, x].






This means that x̃ki
S→ µ̃(i) for each role i ∈ N . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Apply Theorem 2 to see that for all i ∈ N , x̃ki
S→ µ̃(i), where γj ≥ 0










j ) and m
(i) = (m
(i)





















where the last equality follows because the random variables ẽ
(i)
1 , . . . , ẽ
(i)
n are independent by as-
sumption. We first show that (µ̃(i) −m(i))/s(i) D−→ N (0, 1) by applying Lyapunov’s Central Limit
Theorem to the independent (but not identically distributed) random variables γ1ẽ
(i)
1 , . . . , γnẽ
(i)
n .
To shorten notation, let z̃(i) = ẽ(i) − m(i). Lyapunov’s CLT requires the existence of δ > 0























We find an upper bound that tends to zero. Note that z̃(i) is bounded because both ẽ(i) and
m
















































































Since D and δ are independent of n, Lyapunov’s condition is satisfied if γ̄/s(i) → 0 as n → ∞. As































2 → ∞. Thus, (µ̃(i) − m(i))/s(i) D−→ N (0, 1), which is
equivalent to µ̃(i)
S→ N (0, 1). Since x̃ki
S→ µ̃(i) by Theorem 2, we obtain that x̃ki
S→ N (0, 1). Then,
since the normal distribution is a stable distribution (i.e., a normal random variable remains normal
after affine transformations), we conclude that x̃ki






















i ], the limiting distribution of x̃
k
i is the
corresponding truncated normal in Uki . 








































This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The matrix W is regular and, therefore, W1 = λ11 by the Perron-
Frobenius theorem, where λ1 is the dominant eigenvalue of W. Also λ1 = q because λ1(H) = 1 by
the regularity of the baseline matrix H. Since for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ N+, Uk+1i is a subinterval
of Uki , the vector D




[xk,xk+1] ∪ [xk+1,xk] if k < K
[xK ,xK ] if k = K.
Given a reasoning level k < K, the sizes of the k’th discrimination sets |Dk| ≡ (|Dki |)ni=1 are
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given by the expression
|Dk| = (xk+1 − xk) + (xk − xk+1)







= (x− x)λk1(1− λ1)1.
Similarly, |DK | = (x − x)λK1 1. Hence,|Dki | is independent of the player role i, which allows us to
















We finally show that the global maximum is attained at λ̂1 = (K+1)/(K+3). Since λ1 ∈ [0, 1], the
base of the exponentiation in L(λ1;K) is non-negative on the whole domain of λ1, which implies
that the we can maximize instead the function L̃(λ1;K) = λ
K(K+1)
2
1 (1 − λ1)K in λ1. It follows
from straightforward calculus that the unique critical point of L̃(λ1;K) is λ̂1 = (K + 1)/(K + 3).
Finally, since L(0;K) = L2(1;K) = 0 and since L̃ is continuous and non-negative on λ1 ∈ [0, 1], it
must be the case that λ̂1 = (K + 1)/(K + 3) is a global maximum. 
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